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The influence of institutional context on corporate social responsibility 
disclosure: a case of a developing country 
In this paper, we examine the influence of the institutional environment on the adoption of 
Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (CSRD) in Libya. In doing so, we use 
isomorphism as a neo-institutionalist theoretical construction that explores whether 
institutional factors act as pressures for CSRD practices. Using a qualitative method, the 
findings show that, despite managers perceive some coercive, mimetic and normative 
pressures interplay to influence CSRD, the revision of the firms’ laws and policies and the 
establishment of CSRD regulations and monitoring institutions should be established and 
undertaken to improve accounting disclosure. The results propose important implications for 
adapting CSRD for firms and policy-makers in developing countries. 
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1. Introduction  
In recent years, the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (CSRD) has 
developed dramatically (Adhikariparajul et al., 2019; Ali & Ruhaya, 2013; Mashat, 2005), 
and companies currently recognise that in order to survive and remain significant in the 
business world and gain intentional benefits, they must operate in a “socially responsible” 
manner, which requires a disclosure of their environmental and social information (Alnabsha 
et al., 2018; Alshbili et al., 2019; Deegan, 2002). However, a review of the literature shows 
that the level of CSRD practices is different between developed and developing countries, 
because developed countries have employed practical actions and procedures to push firms to 
reveal their CSR information (Barakat et al., 2015; Elmagrhi et al., 2019; Gerged et al., 2018). 
For example, while the UK government has appointed a CSR minister in the sectors of 
industry and commerce, France has passed a compulsory law where firms with 300 employees 
or more must draft CSR reports (Luetkenhorst, 2004). However, in developing countries, 
these initiatives have not encountered comparable interest (Jamali, 2007), because the 
institutions, economic development, standards and official systems that promote CSRD are 
fairly weak (Barakat et al., 2015; Kemp, 2001). The differences between developed and 
developing countries suggest that CSRD practice is largely affected by the institutional 
context in which firms operate. Consequently, this study examines the influence of the 
institutional context on CSRD practices in Libya, a mainly remarkable and valuable 
environment to study CSRD for a variety of reasons.  
First, Libya has witnessed changes in its government regime, unlike developed countries, 
which are characterized by relative stability in their systems of governance (Eljayash, 2015). 
Therefore, the state and its institutional environment remain weak, with local and non-state 
actors driving the political transition, which could drive by a free media, and an emergent civil 
society (Boduszyński & Pickard, 2013), and thus, the business environment has become more 
difficult and challenging. Second, Libya is a member of the organisation of petroleum 
exporting countries, and has the biggest oil reserves in Africa, which represent approximately 
3% of the world’s oil reserves, and therefore, is a vital contributor to the worldwide supply of 
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sweet and light crude oil (Shareia, 2014). Therefore, firms that work in this sector are highly 
risky in terms of employee health and safety conditions and environmental repercussions 
(Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010).   
We respond to a number of calls for further investigation of contextual and institutional factors 
in developing countries such as Libya (Islam and Deegan 2008; Belal et al., 2013; Tilt 2018). 
The study utilises DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 1991) framework to explore the factors that 
influence the adoption of CSRD practices. DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 1991) show that firms 
may respond to three types of pressures. For instance, coercive pressure stems from both 
informal and formal pressures applied by powerful actors such as the government (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983, 1991), while mimetic pressure arises primarily from uncertainty in the 
environment. Normative pressure covers both norms and values that defend how different 
actors should behave (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991).  
To date, the CSRD practices reported by Libya firms, the relevant pressures they receive from 
governmental organisations or their parent companies (if any) and, most importantly, the 
motivations behind their CSRD practice, are still under-explored in the literature. This study 
aims to fill this gap in the literature by addressing the next two research questions. 
• To what extent do external institutional pressures influence the adoption of CSRD 
practices in oil and gas firms operating in Libya. 
• What are the specific drivers (external and internal) and the obstacles that act as major 
impediments to their further development in the oil and gas firms working in Libya? 
In order to answer these research questions, the article studies CSRD practices by seeking the 
relevant perceptions of managers and policy and decision makers within the NOC through 
interviews. The interview method was considered to be suitable as the research involved 
access to the appropriate experiences and knowledge of the managers of oil and gas firms and 
the policy and decision makers within the NOC regarding their own CSRD practices 
(O'Dwyer, Unerman, & Bradley, 2005). We collected interview data using in-depth semi-
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structured interviews of 14 senior managers of oil and gas firms and 6 policy and decision 
makers within the NOC in Libya, to establish their motivations in relation to CSRD. Due to 
the cultural, economic and political setting of Libya, in-depth semi-structured interviews 
enhance our understanding of CSRD that involves managers, and various stakeholders. 
The importance of our study is to facilitate our understanding of the problems of CSRD in 
less developed countries, which cannot be devalued since the majority of the world's 
population lives in developing countries that have unique social, cultural, political and 
environmental characteristics (Fifka 2013; Tilt 2018; United Nations 2013). Understanding 
the problems and the context in which CSRD issues occur can improve policy, provide better 
support and provide adequate supervision to encourage better CSRD outcomes. Likewise, in 
the Middle East, particularly in Libya, there is very limited knowledge about disclosure to a 
large extent and the drivers of, and barriers to, CSRD more specifically. Similarly, the lack of 
civil rights, weak NGOs and free press indicate that the mechanisms to promote CSRD should 
affect these complex, and regularly inconsistent, drivers. To do this, a better understanding of 
Libya and its context is needed. Due to cultural, economic and political differences in Libya, 
the only way to recognise, and advance, CSRD is to perform fieldwork that involves 
managers, professionals, and various stakeholders. This study could possibly initiate 
knowledge that can help improved policy and motivations for firms to both involve in, and 
disclose on, CSR. In such an exceptional context with enormous natural wealth that is subject 
to the highest levels of ruin (Kwansah-Aidoo 2007), accounting and reporting is a vital tool 
for policy-makers. 
This article is organised as follows. Section 2 provides background information about Libya, 
followed by a discussion of isomorphism and a review of the literature in Section 3. Section 
4 highlights data collection and data analysis techniques. The article then proceeds with the 
presentation of the empirical results in section 4, while section 5 deals with the discussion and 
contribution of the research. The final section concludes the article. 
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2. Libya - A brief profile 
Libya is an Arab country, geographically located in the north central part of Africa. It occupies 
an area of 1,759,540 km2, which is comparable in size to the state of Sudan (World Bank, 
2016). Libya was the first country to achieve autonomy through the United Nations and one 
of the first former European possessions in Africa to gain independence on December 24, 
1951. Libya shares common borders with Tunisia and Algeria in the west, Egypt and Sudan 
in the east, Chad and Niger in the south, and the Mediterranean Sea in the north. In 2014, the 
population was 6 million, and the official language is Arabic. The Ottoman Turks took control 
of the country in 1551, and the colonization continued till Libya achieved independence in 
1951. After leading the country for 18 years, King Idris al-Sanusi was overthrown in a 
successful military coup in 1969. Subsequently, Libya was ruled by Qadhafi until October 
2011, who was then violently murdered in 2011 during widespread protests that escalated 
rapidly into a national popular rebellion. Although the General National Congress, a 
parliament dominated by Islamists, located in the western region, ruled the country 
legitimately until June 25, 2014, refused to recognize its most liberal successor, the House of 
Representatives, located in the eastern region. This caused each parliament to have its own 
government. While the UN has been working to reconcile governments and encourage them 
to form a national unity government (The World FactBook, 2016), the two parliaments have 
failed to compromise and reach political agreements until now. 
In order to regulate the business environment, the state of Libya has created institutions and 
several laws that were expected to have a great impact on accounting practice. The 
constitutional regulations of a country can indirectly or directly have influence its corporate 
reporting and disclosures practice (Hawashe, 2014). Table 1 presents the institutions, laws 
and key aspects of them, and shows that that the NOC seems to exert pressure on companies, 
not only to follow their reporting guidelines, but also specifies the type of information they 
need to report on. The firms’ management practice, therefore, would have to take into account 
the NOC’s aspiration and gain the support of such an authority, since it could not merely help 
legitimise corporate operations, but also allow access to additional resources. Despite this, the 
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other legal and regulatory framework in the country do not make any reference to CSR 
information or its disclosure, therefore significant shortcomings in the regulatory framework 
and legal system and the lack of environmental remediation facilities continue being key 
issues. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
3. Theoretical underpinnings and literature review 
The neo-institutional theory (Elamer et al., 2017; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1987, 2014) explains how firms accept and respond to the alteration of 
institutional and social pressures and anticipations to sustain legitimacy. It focusses on the 
behaviour of companies who are motivated by pressures in broader society, and focuses on 
the behaviour of companies motivated by pressures in a particular institutional milieu, by 
accommodating to norms and rules that are highly respected by the society (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983, 1991; Greenwood et al., 2013). DiMaggio & Powell (1983, 1991) offer a 
framework of three distinct, interrelated, and equally reinforcing institutional pillars - the 
coercive, normative and mimetic pillars, which are valuable in analysing institutional 
pressures on companies. Because it is important that companies achieve and maintain 
legitimacy in the environments in which they operate, they may experience different pressures 
to adopt specific practices and become isomorphic with the institutional context in which they 
operate (Kostova & Roth, 2002). Coercive pressure stems from both informal and formal 
pressures applied by powerful actors, such as the government, on which the firm dependents. 
This pressure can occur in the form of invitations, persuasions or orders to change and adopt 
a particular organisational practice (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991). Informal pressures 
include codes of conduct, monitoring and guidelines, while formal pressures include 
regulations and laws (Kim et al., 2013). To avoid punishments, companies act in response to 
these pressures and implement the necessary organisational practice (Greenwood et al., 2013). 
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The normative pillar influences values (which in a social context is acceptable to follow) and 
norms (how things should be done). In other words, it highlights the conventions and actions 
that are legitimate for society by acting in a way they expect and consider suitable and 
ethically accurate (Scott, 2014). The mimetic pressure arises primarily from the ambiguity 
within the environment, which leads a company to imitate other fruitful companies (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983, 1991; Greenwood et al., 2013). Consequently, companies achieve legitimacy 
in their environment may raise their opportunities of success and survival by conforming to 
such pressures (Grecco et al., 2013; Kostova & Roth, 2002). Therefore, mimetic isomorphism 
could be considered a reaction to organisational questionability by pursuing the best course in 
practice. In other words, the pressure of this mimetic pillar is to identify and compare the most 
excellent practices in the field, so that the copy of these practices arises as a result of their 
institutional approval. Consequently, companies achieve legitimacy in their environment and 
increase their chances of success and survival by adjusting to such pressures (Grecco et al., 
2013; Kostova and Roth, 2002). This is important to protect the reputation of companies and 
ensure their continued existence. 
The coercive pressures for CSRD directly influence the CSRD activities of companies through 
government regulations and rules (Othman et al., 2011). Each government creates its own 
monitoring pressures on CSRD, facilitating or endorsing specific practices (Pedersen et al., 
2013). For example, while the UK government has appointed a CSR minister in the Industry 
and Commerce sectors, France on the other hand has passed a mandatory law where firms 
with 300 employees or more must write CSR reports (Wanderley et al., 2008). However, in 
developing countries, these initiatives have not found comparable interest (Jamali, 2007), 
because the institutions, and legal systems that promote CSRD are somewhat weak (Kemp, 
2001). Despite this, global pressures could influence firms to adopt CSRD practices in 
developing countries. For example, global codes, such as the Global Reporting Initiative, ISO 
reporting requirements, could make firms respond to these pressures in order to obtain 
“legitimacy” with their peers. 
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The normative pressures for CSRD practice must also respond to the social norms, values and 
expectations of society (Grecco et al., 2013). Compliance with social expectations contributes 
to the organisational survival and success. While in many countries what motivates businesses 
is to make a profit, in other countries, a social rationalisation is needed to achieve that goal. 
For example, in North African countries, it is estimated that companies reflect the values of 
the economy and the diligence of the East, and value social development more than singular 
needs. Uncertainty could also constrain business activity (Setyorini & Ishak, 2012). CSRD 
practices policies and behaviours in many developing countries are based on national and 
social traditions (Welford, 2005). However, due to the fragile state of the institutional 
environment in some developing countries, some companies may tend to mimic the 
performance, structure and practices of other companies that are perceived as more successful 
in terms of CSRD practice (Grecco et al., 2013). As such, firms use CSRD as a means to 
participate in and responding to institutional pressures.  
Empirically, Belal and Owen (2007) find that firms disclose their CSR information due to the 
perceived pressure of external forces, particularly parent companies’ instructions and 
demands from international buyer. However, while Amran and Devi (2008) and Othman et 
al. (2011) found  that regulatory efforts are a significant means to support CSRD practices in 
Malaysia, in contrast, Setyorini and Ishak (2012) found that under the uncertainty of the 
Indonesian government instrument for CSRD practice, firms seem to mimic structure, practice 
and performance from other successful firms. Pedersen et al. (2013) show that while it was 
found that government coercive pressures influence the practice of the CSRD, the firms that 
report for the first time were motivated by other firms, guidelines, and standards. Additionally, 
although Hossain (2012) found that firms engage in CSRD practice to help them build better 
relationships with government and society, Beddewela and Herzig (2013) found that 
subsidiary firms in Sri Lanka are prodigiously motivated by their need to achieve internal 
legitimacy and comply with the formal institutionalised processes to report CSR. Belal et al. 
(2015) found that promoting social welfare motives, gaining publicity, and influence of GRI 
and ISO 26000 are key motivations for the Islamic Bank Bangladesh to engage in CSR 
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reporting, but Zhao and Patten (2016) improvements in the image, mainly related with public 
interaction to influence CSRD in China.  
It is clear from the above review that there is no single motivation, per se, to disclose CSR 
information. On the contrary, institutions, regulations and culture, which vary in many 
countries, are significant in the monitoring firms’ actions and the effective enforcement of 
standards related to CSRD (Dhaliwal et al., 2014). Therefore, understanding the moderating 
influence of a country's factors on CSR may not simply help to put the conclusions of the CSR 
literature in the right perspective, but it can also provide new insights into the problems related 
to CSR. As such, based on the review of the above theoretical and empirical literature, this 
research expects to fill three key gaps, which are: a) limited empirical studies that examine 
the influence of the specific institutional setting on the adoption of the CSRD in the North 
African context, b) limited empirical studies (Amran & Haniffa, 2011; Beddewela & Herzig, 
2013; Belal & Owen, 2007; Zhao & Patten, 2016) applying neo-institutional theory to 
examine the factors that influence CSRD in a developing country context, and c) overcoming 
a major weakness in existing Libyan studies (i.e. Mashat, 2005), which lack a theoretical 
underpinning and are conducted outside of the oil and gas sector. Consequently, this research 
seeks to utilise isomorphism as a neo-institutionalist theoretical construct that explore whether 
institutional factors act as pressures for CSRD practices (as shown in Figure 1). 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                       INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
For decades, organisational approaches and behaviours have been designed according to 
social requirements and pressures (Fernández-Allés and Valle-Cabrera, 2006). Based on this 
argument, the response to the external and internal context in which firms work and maintain 
their acts and behaviours is critical to their existence (Dacin, 1997, Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 
2014). On the one hand, the institutionalisation of norms, values and structures and social 
behaviours arises from formal and informal processes between internal groups within the 
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company (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). On the other hand, the external context is cogitated 
vital with regard to the probability of launching a number of relations between the firm and 
the regulations and rules of the regime, professional organizations (authorisation and 
certification) and other organizations, particularly those that are in the same industry (Barrena 
Martínez et al., 2016). 
DiMaggio and Walter (1983) depicted isomorphism as: “a constraining process that forces 
one unit of population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental 
conditions”. Dillard et al. (2004) illustrated it as: “Isomorphism refers to the adaptation of an 
institutional practice by an organization”. Thus, isomorphism denotes to the process 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983) by which the companies adapt institutional practices (e.g. 
CSRD) of other organisations (Dillard et al. 2004). 
These three contributions of isomorphism, described within the approach of the original 
institutionalism, help describe why organisations consider that the imitation of recognised 
behaviours in their environment is capable of confirming the legitimacy of the groups and 
institutions that comprise it. However, the new institutional development, considered as neo-
institutionalism, proposes that organisations and their policies be significantly affected by 
cultural variables, legal, historical and political institutions that describe detailed forms of 
behaviour for several countries (Doh & Guay, 2006, Powell & DiMaggio, 2012). Neo-
institutional theory suggests that firms require to adapt their CSR practices that mimic the key 
formal institutions (e.g. policies, laws or/and private arrangements) and informal institutions 
(e.g. cultural heritage, customs, religious beliefs or professional routines) since they will not 
able to survive without a particular level of external social support (e.g. Barrena‐Martínez et 
al., 2016; Jamali et al., 2017; Frynas & Yamahaki, 2016). 
Our theoretical model is based on neo-institutional theory and presumes that formal and 
informal CSR institutions may form the CSR disclosure agenda in developing countries such 
as Libya in a similar way to what they evidently do in developed ones (see Campbell, 2004, 
2007; Deegan and Blomquist, 2006; Hiss, 2009; Perez‐Batres et al., 2012). In details, the neo-
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institutional lens offers strong evidence that the disclosure of CSR may be improved by a 
series of institutions and various types of isomorphisms (e.g., Gallego‐Álvarez and Quina‐
Custodio, 2017). We precisely explore the impact of formal and informal CSR institutions on 
adoption of CSRD. Particularly, we follow earlier CSR disclosure literature such as Perez‐
Batres et al. (2012), Deegan and Blomquist (2006), and Sumiani et al. (2007), which revealed 
that the disclosure of CSR is shaped by institutions that support CSR. In summary, the 
motivations of firms towards CSRD may be inclined by the coercive, mimetic and normative 
isomorphism in the institutional environment of Libya. Figure 1 represents a model of the 
hypothesized pressures to adopt CSR disclosure. 
4. Method 
A qualitative approach was used to explore the pressures and factors that influence CSRD 
adoption, which is specifically suitable for examining factors that are not formerly codified or 
perceived (Siggelkow, 2007). Due to the nature of qualitative data, which is different from 
quantitative data, its validity and reliability depend greatly on the gathering of data and the 
process of analysis (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011). As such, one of the key challenges in 
qualitative research is to ensure that the collection of data and its analysis meets the tests of 
validity and reliability (King & Horrocks, 2010). Consequently, to achieve transferability and 
credibility (external and internal validity), dependability (reliability) and conformability 
(objectivity) in its results, the researcher followed the criteria as proposed by Lincoln and 
Guba (1985) and Silverman (2011).   
Credibility refers to extent to which the interpretation of the investigator is authorised by those 
with whom the study was accomplished (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). As this study was carried 
out only by us, credibility was obtained by ensuring that the access quality was achieved by 
us to companies and by maintaining a complete record of the study through having a research 
diary about the interviews undertaken. Transferability, which replaces generalizability, refers 
to the investigator's ability to provide sufficient details so that the reader can consider to what 
extent the conclusion drawn in one environment could be transferred or that makes 
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transferability judgments possible to another environment (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The 
criteria in this research were addressed by giving details linked to the participants, the 
interview procedures, transcription and following analysis of the data gathered.  
Dependability, which replaces reliability, refers to the degree of constancy in the study 
settings, so that the study can be replicated elsewhere (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). A qualitative 
research in general assumes that real-world settings unavoidably alter, and replication is 
therefore not achievable. The necessity, thus, in qualitative studies, is to show that the 
investigator has taken into consideration the natural unsteadiness of the facts they are 
researching. However, with the intention of increasing the reliability of the interviews, 
Silverman (2011) proposes three key criteria. First, the development of interview guidelines 
in an obvious and understandable way for the interviewees should be considered. Secondly, 
in order to make the results more dependable, precise taping and transcribing is needed. 
Finally, inter-coding reliability requests are to be sustained. Therefore, it is significant to 
stay away from any uncertainty when data is coded, such as the overlap between the coding 
groupings or errors of simple coding. As such, the dependability of this research was 
obtained through multiple stages of coding the data, ensuring the robustness of the study 
results. 
Finally, the conformability, which replaces neutrality, refers to where the researcher should 
present adequate details regarding the data gathering process and analysis, so that it is obvious 
to a reader how the investigator may have arrived at a particular conclusion (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985). Thus, in this study, the conformability was obtained through providing full details 
linked to all phases of gathering the data, with real evidence of the gathered data, in addition 
to the stages of the data analysis. In addition to this, Louise and While (1994) claim that an 
interviews’ validity is established by the extent to which participants are keen to offer a well-
informed data in which this research involved a careful selection of interviewees. 
4.1 Data Collection 
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The data were obtained from 20 in-depth semi-structured interviews conducted with two 
groups. The first group were the managers of the oil and gas companies that were in a position 
to deal with the demands / pressures to disseminate CSR information (see table 2). These 
managers were selected due to their persuasive influence on corporate disclosure (Ntim et al., 
2015). The second group were regulators and policy makers within the NOC that were 
identified by company managers as the body responsible for pressuring companies to 
disseminate CSR information (see table 3). The selection of the interviewees was based on 
the agreement of the interviewee in the will to be interviewed and their knowledge on the 
subject (Bailey & Peck, 2013). The process of conducting the interviews was carried out 
through several steps. Consent forms were given to both groups to sign as an agreement that 
they had agreed to contribute to the investigation. Each interview was conducted in each 
company or organization and the questions that were used were open questions, that is, how / 
why / what / to what extent, to obtain as much data as possible. A total of 14 internal actors 
and 6 external actors were performed in 13 weeks, from September to December 2014, using 
the Arabic language and varied between 43 and 78 minutes. Secondary data was also collected 
during the same period. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
4.2 Data Analysis  
Data analysis was performed in four stages. The first stage was to transcribe each interview 
in Arabic in a notebook document similar to a global Microsoft 2013 document (King & 
Horrocks, 2010). The average duration of each interview transcript was around 8 to 10 pages. 
Miles and Huberman (1994) said that before ordering and examining the data collected, the 
researcher needs to familiarize himself with his data. Therefore, the second stage consisted in 
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carrying out a microanalysis of each interview, to understand any invisible meaning within 
the paragraphs, sentences and words. A translation of each interview was made from Arabic 
to English as the third stage and a great effort was made to preserve the original meanings in 
each case. The final stage was to transfer and order all interviews as a project in NVivo 10 
software. Secondary analysis has begun for both actors by developing a code system to 
classify the data through the thematic analysis technique as recommended. by King and 
Horrocks (2010). The coding of the thematic analysis involved reading and rereading the 
transcript of the interview looking at patterns of topics in the entire data set based on the 
research question and the predefined variables. This process was carried out through two main 
stages as suggested by King and Horrocks (2010); the descriptive / initial coding stage, the 
interpretive coding stage (see table 4). 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
5. Findings  
Institutional Factors Influencing CSRD 
The Influence of the NOC  
Although there are no legal requirements for the CSRD in Libya, this investigation observes 
how the Libyan state through its governing body, the NOC, exerts informal pressure on oil 
and gas companies to follow their reporting guidelines (i.e., HSE.GDL.001.00 and HSE. 
PRO.002.00). This is evident by the managers of several companies that emphasized that they 
follow the NOC guidelines in terms of making their annual reports. Although the NOC acts 
as a government institution that has the coercive authority of the state to control the behaviour 
of the lower social actors that they understand at the organizational level, the absence of strict 
and complete strict regulation can act as a barrier. However, because any oil and / or gas 
company that wishes to operate in the Libyan oil and gas industry has to obtain a license from 
this authority and allow periodic checks to be carried out, obtaining the support of that 
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authority may not only help legitimize corporate operations, but similarly allows access to 
additional resources. A manager of a local company explains this tension well: 
“[...] our activity of social responsibility disclosure is guided by the National 
Oil Corporation from overseas training, medical insurance, and employment of 
graduates to occupational health. All kinds of social activities at the moment 
are prepared by us as influenced by National Oil Corporation. [...]”  
(Financial Manager, Local Company One, 2014) 
Although the CSRD was of low importance within the old regime, the post-government war 
through its governing body, the NOC, began to take the social and the environmental 
seriously, when they established a sustainable development department in All rules (NOC, 
2012) to encourage companies to participate in CSR and its dissemination. Since most of the 
local oil and gas companies are public companies, and due to the close connection with the 
government (because they are owned by the NOC), they need to balance the profit objective 
with the NOC reporting guidelines, including the agenda of the CSRD. A joint venture 
manager comments:  
“Actually, the majority of our company’s annual reports and other local 
companies are similar in terms of style, because they are guided by the National 
Oil Corporation monitoring and reporting requirements, a few other companies 
might fancy reporting a bit more, yet we report based upon the requirements 
from the National Oil Corporation [...]” 
 (Head of Health, Safety and Environment, JV Company One, 2014) 
While the post war government has reiterated its willingness to meet certain social and 
environmental expectations by providing guidelines for social responsibility reports after 
2011 (see table 5), such guidelines are a voluntary initiative. The purpose of these guidelines 
is to effectively communicate current social responsibility to the NOC headquarters to ensure 
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compliance with internal pressures and obtain internal legitimacy. Therefore, companies must 
align their decisions with government aspirations, which is significant for their continued 
existence. Through its activities, the dynamics of field coercion comes into play. As a manager 
of a local company says: 
“We now have guidelines from the National Oil Corporation and minimum 
reporting requirements of HSE data, [...] the National Oil Corporation is our 
customer and it’s a governmental body, [...] We need to follow their guidelines 
and report the social and environmental information that are required” 
(Environmental Manager, Local Company Four, 2014)  
One external actor confirms such pressure and adds:   
“[...] we have [established] monitoring reporting requirements to report 
environmental data, safety data, and health data, as well as energy data. So the 
local companies are required to provide [….] reports about their activities 
whether they are social or financial [...]” 
(Interviewee Four, NOC, 2014)  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The nature of the CSRD differs between countries, and even more between developed and 
developing nations (Belal and Momin, 2009; Imam, 2000). Our study shows that the main 
driving force of the CSRD that emerged appeared to be regulatory requirements and 
government effect. The promotion of NOCs was also supposed to be an important driving 
force. Government effects and regulators as drivers of CSRD have been demonstrated in 
several studies in different countries (Kuasirikun, 2005; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000; Kolk, 
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2003; Harvey and Schaefer, 2001). For example, Rowe and Guthrie (2010) interviewed senior 
managers of 15 companies in China and identified the government's coercive institutional 
participation as the main driver of CSR initiatives and reports. From a theoretical neo-
institutional point of view, the regulatory effect of the Libyan government is coercive 
isomorphism that forced companies to respond to government regulation and other pressures. 
In conclusion, the previous findings show that NOC, as a social institution, has the coercive 
authority of the state to control the behaviour of companies. The adoption of government 
requirements and policies by companies, especially those owned by the state, seems to be the 
result of the need to appear legitimate to continue their long-term survival and obtain internal 
legitimacy from their central office. By meeting the minimum requirements through the 
dissemination of social and environmental information following established guidelines, oil 
and gas companies expect to represent and improve their reputation in the eyes of the state. In 
this case, the government seems to play an important role, especially in the post-2011 changes, 
where a series of policies and guidelines have been introduced. 
The Influence of Overseas Partners 
Although the NOC has established reporting guidelines for CSRD, local companies have been 
exposed to and are greatly influenced by western management style. This finding is most 
evident where local companies who operate in the oil and gas industry with a joint venture 
status have progressively complied with their foreign partner standard and regulations such as 
the ISO 14001, and OHSAS 18001 certifications and polices. The majority of the foreign 
partners come from developed countries such as the US, Italy, Canada, and France, thus, these 
firms are pressurised by the market to conform to the standards of CSR signalling their home 
countries’ influences. The Director of Finance from foreign company two remarks about this 
tension clearly:  
“[…] local firms with a foreign partner are more driven by their foreign partner 
to disclose social information. They are subject to additional reporting 
19 
 
requirements from their foreign partner, and usually under pressure. Foreign 
companies usually have shareholders. They always pursue attracting new 
investors; consequently, more accurate and reliable social information is 
disclosed” 
(Director of Finance, Foreign Company Two, 2014) 
Indeed, Libyan companies rely heavily on foreign companies in terms of technological 
assistance. Therefore, the reason why the local companies behind entering the joint venture is 
undoubtedly to optimize the benefit of merging the experience and technical capabilities of 
their partners abroad. However, for foreign partners to enter the country, they must have a 
national investor entitled to government support and assistance. Therefore, there is some kind 
of coercive, if not mimetic, pressure on Libyan companies to integrate institutional practices 
such as CSRD. The data analysed shows that local companies that are in a joint venture state 
described how, although their owner did not order the adoption of the CSRD, they were 
influenced by the reporting style of their foreign partner. In this regard, the Head of Accounts 
and Budget of a joint venture explains:  
“We work here in a partnership with [...]. We follow our partner’s reporting 
style. They have a good reporting system. We follow this reporting trend, in 
order to be considered as a world class company”  
(Head of Accounts and Budget, JV Company Five, 2014) 
This mimetic isomorphism was also implemented to clarify the results of some other CSRD 
studies. For example, Amran and Siti-Nabiha's (2009) proposed that the key motivation of 
Malaysian companies for CSRD was to emulate their counterparts in developed countries. 
Aerts and Cormier (2009) described that mimetic and coercive isomorphism motivated 
imitation within the industry in the environmental information practices of companies in 
Canada, France and Germany. In addition, de Villiers and Alexander (2014) show a 
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remarkable similarity in the CSRD structure of mining companies in Australia and South 
America; The companies seemed to use global patterns such as the GRI to form their CSRD, 
and increase the details by denoting national regulations, standards and specific local 
stakeholders. The results were explained using mimetic, normative and coercive isomorphism. 
The Influence of Foreign Owned Firms 
The ambiguity and fragile state of the Libyan institutional environment make it easier for 
business managers to mimic the CSRD strategy of other companies to be more legitimate and 
successful in order to be accepted as part of a wider global network. This pressure is most 
evident when there is no legal requirement for the practice of CSRD. Although the NOC has 
guidelines for reporting, local companies operating in the oil and gas sector seem to have 
difficulties in disseminating social and environmental information. While Libyan society 
assigns companies responsibility for disseminating CSR activities and avoiding state 
sanctions, Libyan managers respond to such pressures by imitating competitors of their 
foreign companies. Two local managers working at senior management level illustrate: 
“[...] we just look at how other foreign oil and gas companies like […] oil and 
gas company include this information in their reports, and we just follow them, 
and those are the key guidance for us”  
(Quality Manager, Local Company One, 2014)  
 “[…] what we do is, we take good international companies who are good 
annual report reporters, and see how they report, how they present their 
information, and we use them as our guidelines; of course there are things that 
we cannot copy, but we want to be good too” 
(Accounts Manager, Local Company Two, 2014) 
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In this regard, foreign owned companies usually come from developed countries, like 
Germany, the US, and the UK and they are more concerned about the disclosure of CSR 
information because they usually have diverse knowledge and values to raise their strategic 
decisions in regards to public and social activities. Therefore, in order to appear legitimate to 
the state among other stakeholders, these firms tend to communicate their CSR activities. In 
this way, local companies, as revealed by the analysed data, imitate to some extent the 
behaviour of these foreign companies in terms of reports to disclose part of their CSR 
information. The following quotes are illustrative of this:   
“We are motivated by the practice of foreign owned companies. These 
companies are successful. We do not have regulations and laws regarding the 
disclosure of social and environment impacts here. So we follow the practice 
of other foreign companies” 
(Accounts Manager, Local Company Two, 2014)  
“Companies that are owned by foreigners influence considerably on local 
companies’ corporate behaviour. They are influenced by the western 
management style. Wherever they go they report and disclose their activities. 
They are successful”. 
(Environmental Manager, JV Company Four, 2014) 
The Influence of Cultural Factors on CSRD  
The adoption of CSRD by companies operating in the oil and gas industry of Libya is also 
driven by pressures derived from the need to maintain the reputation and pressures of the 
company to meet the expectations of society. This is evident by several managers who 
identified these factors as social drivers for CSRD. Some of the main oil and gas managers 
interviewed perceived the reputation and image of a company as the main driver to adopt 
CSRD, while working within society. Most oil and gas companies embark on practices of 
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dissemination of environmental and social responsibilities in response to their personal 
convictions of doing something for the community. In fact, participation in CSRD practice is 
more likely to promote a company's reputation and image to become a better business. In this 
case, the finance director of the foreign company two and the quality manager of the local 
company, respectively commented: 
“Our driving force is improving our company’s reputation and image, and its 
value in the market. We have to present a good image to the government [...], 
and to our employees. This will lead to increase in the level of satisfaction of 
our employees, thus increasing their devotion and their integration within our 
company” 
 (Director of Finance, Foreign Company Two, 2014) 
“It’s our reputation. As you know, reputation is built based on company’s 
history, ethics, morality and its public image. One way of keeping this 
reputation, [...] is through participating in social activities, letting the public 
know about it, and so a positive image is created”  
(Quality Manager, Local Company One, 2014) 
The public relations strategies developed by companies in Libya to increase the trust of 
stakeholders in them reflect how they reconcile these pressures. Companies in Libya focus on 
issues such as the justification of their existence within society through an upward approach 
not only to focus on government relations, but, more significantly, to build trust and long-
term relationships with local residents. As such, the cultural and social norms of Libya would 
lead us to anticipate the explicit CSRD, but they are still hidden. Given the complex pressures, 
CSRD practice remains predominantly normative in response to the country's national systems 
and interests. In this case, it became clear that several interviewees highlighted how important 
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public expectations are and how important they should be to meet their needs when making 
immediate CSRD decisions:  
“The public have expectations from us; we need to communicate our 
occupational health and safety information. We need to show a good treatment 
of the local communities and being friendly with the environment [...]. If we, 
as a company, do not meet these expectations which are always changing, our 
existence will be threatened. Thus, one way of meeting these expectations is 
through a disclosure channel of our social activities”  
(Environmental Manager, JV Company Three, 2014) 
In addition, several respondents attributed the social obligation as one of the key drivers of 
the adoption of the CSRD practice. As a country, Libya continues to rely heavily on oil 
revenues, therefore, oil and gas companies have voluntarily integrated into the disclosure 
element, proactively boosting bidirectional communications to respond to the concerns raised 
by society. In many cases, the practice of CSRD goes beyond compliance with legal 
requirements, and companies recognize the need to understand how their activities interact 
with sensitive environments. Managers, therefore, emphasize that compliance with the social 
obligation is a key factor of CSRD in Libya. For example, the Head of Health, Safety and 
Environment of a two joint venture explains: 
“I believe in social obligation. As a company, we work in a sensitive 
environment that has an effect on the environment and people who live nearby 
the oil fields; everyone knows this. So the company’s commitment is to do 
something for this community. Today we do make profit; we should share some 
of it with the society, because as a company we won’t be affected much” 




These results are supported by Momin and Parker (2013). They studied the CSRD incentive 
by interviewing 39 managers in multinational corporation (MNC) companies listed in 
Bangladesh. Their article is the first extensive work on the motivation of the CSRD of MNC 
subsidiaries in Bangladesh. They used several theories, integrating institutional and neo-
institutional theory, and propose that a desire for internal legitimacy arises as the main 
motivating influence for CSRD practices, while the contextual characteristics of the external 
host country limit such practices in Bangladesh. Jamali et al. (2009) in the context of the 
Middle East show that CSRD varies among countries because of different cultural and 
institutional realities. As Deegan and Unerman (2006) argue, accounting practices cannot be 
secluded from culture, human and social institutions, it is culturally determined. Therefore, 
cultural customs, values, beliefs and norms impact CSRD. 
In summary, a more visible and open corporate culture has begun to emerge for oil and gas 
companies in Libya, and this has allowed CSRD to integrate even more as a critical part of 
their business, mainly because they want to succeed in the context. Libyan Cultural factors, 
highlight some interesting points. While the pressure of cultural factors is evident, to see the 
explicit CSRD in Libya (that is, the social normative pressures that arise from social 
obligations and the reputation and image of companies), a more complex dynamic of " 
powerlessness" to influence organizational change in a fragile state is evident as well. By 
uniting these types of cultural factors, local legitimation pressures, demonstrated in the form 
of normative pressures, can clearly explain why these companies adopt CSRD in the first 
place. However, what is evident from the analysis is that there is a growing awareness of the 
CSRD in Libya both among trade associations and between companies. 
Other Factors Influencing CSRD  
The interview analysis also indicates that firms of foreign investors operating in the Libyan 
oil and gas industry are forced by the reporting culture of their parent company from an 
internal perspective. Most foreign companies come from developed countries such as 
Germany (in the case of Wintershall) and France (in the case of Total), etc., where social and 
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environmental awareness is high. Therefore, such companies usually implement accounting 
practices and a dissemination culture similar to the parent company, since they share 
comparable policies and missions. This can be seen as crucial for the survival of a subsidiary, 
as a consequence of its dependence on the parent company for continuous access to resources 
such as technology, knowledge and capital. This suggests that the CSR practices of foreign 
companies are influenced by international stakeholders, moderated by the parent company's 
policy, to a greater extent than only local stakeholders in Libya: 
“We are a subsidiary of […] company. […] has an excellent social and 
environmental reporting system. We follow the reporting culture of the parent. 
We share the same policy, the same social responsibility policy”  
(Head of Health, Safety and Environment, Foreign Company Three, 2014) 
“For us, we disclose our social information, because our parent expects us to 
disclose this information to become more efficient. We need to confirm the 
demands and expectations of our parent. Otherwise we would be in trouble. So 
we follow […] our parent, and this is our main guidance” 
(Director of Finance, Foreign Company Two, 2014) 
The data analysed from the interview also show that the activities of large and old companies 
are of interest to many interested parties and these factors are considered important in 
influencing the practice of the ERSC. The large size reflects higher levels of CSRD, what the 
government wants, and age has the advantage of institutional relationships built over time 
with external institutions that companies can use for their benefit. These factors are important 
attributes, because they shape the internal capacity and behaviour of companies, while 
simultaneously interacting with the external environmental context to shape the behaviours 
and performance of companies. Large and old companies, as the main managers observe, face 
different pressures in Libya, because they are more visible in the eyes of the government. 
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Therefore, these companies disclose more information about CSR on purpose. Two managers 
express this tension well: 
 “We are a large company in terms of size; we need to engage more in social 
responsibility activities [...] than small firms. We have to provide high level of 
disclosure, because we are more visible in the eyes of government, and have 
more impact on the community. Other large firms practise disclosure and 
therefore, we need to be like them and disclose more than unknown small 
companies” 
(Director of Finance, Foreign Company Two, 2014) 
“The level of CSRD differs between new firms and old firms, because other 
circumstances such as experience in the market play a very crucial role. We are 
new company. We look at new firms; they do not disclose much of this 
information. Old firms do and get more advantages from disclosure than new 
firms. New firms usually struggle about how to even report, so usually they use 
basic reporting style”  
(Auditor, Foreign Company Four, 2014) 
The auditor of local company one confirms such pressure and adds that the influence of the 
firm’s age on the extent of CSRD practices can just occur in the first few years of the life of 
the firm. As the company gets older than five years, the firm would gain sufficient skills and 
become knowledgeable about involvement of CSRD, therefore, it will become like other old 
companies:       
“The influence of age is normally during the first five years, because new 
companies usually have new staff and equipment, but they do not have enough 
experience regarding how to disclose social and environmental information. 
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However, after five years’ time, I do not see any impact of the age on the level 
of CSRD”  
(Auditor, Local Company One, 2014) 
6. Discussion  
This research aimed to explore whether institutional factors act as pressure for the adoption 
of the CSRD. Although the results show that the NOC, foreign business partners, the behavior 
of the activities of foreign-owned companies, the parent company factor, the size and age of 
the company, the need to maintain reputation and Company pressures to meet the expectations 
of society interact to influence CSRD in the Libyan context, these factors can be discussed 
within the framework of neo-institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 1991), 
classifying and evaluating coercive pressures , regulations and mimetics on the practice of 
CSRD in Libya. 
Coercive pressures generally come from both informal and formal pressures applied by 
powerful actors, such as the government. Informal pressures may include guidelines and codes 
of conduct (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 1991). In Libya, there are no legal requirements for 
the CSRD, but there are guidelines available made by the NOC. Although respondents 
highlighted the NOC as the main reference in the preparation of their annual reports to achieve 
the internal legitimacy of their central office, previous existing studies (Alshbili, 2016; 
Mashat, 2005), found that the level of CSRD was generally low and unsatisfactory. This can 
be attributed to the lack of regulations and regulatory agencies necessary for CSRD to 
succeed. Government regulations and reporting guidelines influence CSRD practices, for 
example, applying sanctions if no action is taken (Gopalan and Kamalnath, 2015), but within 
the situation in Libya, this is not evident. While these findings are in line with several previous 
studies (for example, Amran and Devi, 2008; Islam and Deegan, 2008; Pedersen et al., 2013), 
which indicate that the government has some influence on companies to participate in the 
RSC contradicts the negative influence evidence of Dam and Scholtens (2012). 
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Local companies that have business partners abroad are also exposed to some extent to the 
awareness of Western CSR. While the presence of a foreign partner in Libya influences the 
practices of accounting information and corporate disclosure, it can be argued that such 
influence is temporary to meet the demands of its international stakeholders. In such a 
situation, and in the light of the absence of well-developed and implemented policies for local 
businesses and the absence of a complete and formal institutional agreement, business partners 
abroad help improve CSR. This result is consistent with the findings of previous studies 
(Amran and Devi, 2008; Amran and Haniffa, 2011) that identify some influences of foreign 
partners in local businesses in Malaysia. In addition, due to relatively informal weak coercive 
pressures within the Libyan context (only guidelines have been issued), some managers mimic 
the strategy of other foreign-owned companies in terms of CSRD to achieve legitimacy. This 
finding is in line with previous studies (Beddewela and Herzig, 2013; Islam and Deegan, 
2008) that have determined that companies are sensitive to what their peers do and that 
mimetic pressure could be more significant than coercive pressures. 
While civil society organizations that can pressure companies to reveal their CSR information 
are still absent in the country, the need to maintain the reputation and pressures of companies 
to meet social expectations has been identified as social drivers for the adoption of CSR. 
Societies generally pressure commercial companies to participate in the CSRD, although with 
a soft focus. However, managers of oil and gas companies that employ CSRD are trying to 
achieve ethical legitimacy that reflects not only the cultural values of nations, but also their 
economic and political interests. By adopting the CSRD, which the main institutional actors 
consider "the right thing", companies are trying to impact the ethical judgments of those 
actors. As such, the findings mean once again that CSRD is used as a continuous means to 
manage the reputation and image of a company, and meet the expectations of society, which 




 The study also highlights that due to the observed lack of CSRD framework, enforcement 
and compliance issues, excessive political instability, corporate governance characteristics -
namely parent company factor, firm size and age play a significant role in ensuring reporting 
accountability and disclosure of CSR information.  Although subsidiary firms are connecting 
their long-term strategies with those of the Libyan state, CSRD practices of foreign firms are 
influenced by international stakeholders - moderated by parent company policy - to a bigger 
extent than just by local stakeholders. This perhaps as a consequence of their reliance on on-
going access to resources such as; technology, knowledge, and capital (Kostova & Roth, 
2002). Firm age and size also found to play a pivotal role in guaranteeing good practices, 
transparency, and accountability. Large and big size firms found to reflect higher levels of 
CSRD which government desires. While age reflects relationships in developed countries, the 
significance of the institutional relationships is bigger in developing economies, because of 
the on-going administrative involvement in the economy (Elamer et al., 2018; Elamer et al., 
2018; Elamer & Benyazid, 2018; Elamer et al., 2019; Elamer et al., 2017; Shinkle & 
Kriauciunas, 2010), thus, have high legitimacy, because of the longevity of ties with 
government officials (Shinkle & Kriauciunas, 2010). These findings are consistent with 
previous studies in the case of size (Elamer et al., 2018; Elamer et al., 2018; Elamer & 
Benyazid, 2018; Elamer et al., 2019; Elamer et al., 2017; Khan et al., 2013; Reverte, 2009), 
and age (Sufian, 2012).    
Although the CSRD in Libya seems to be influenced by national and organizational 
influences, which are also open to local and global legitimizing forces, manifested in some 
coercive, normative and mimetic pressures, as illustrated in Figure 2, existing studies 
(Alshbili, 2016; Mashat, 2005), shows that the level of CSRD is generally low and 
unsatisfactory. Despite this, in general, the manifestation of the implementation of the CSRD 
in Libya is mainly a function of different institutional and cultural pressures, that is, coercive, 
normative and mimetic pressures for the search for legitimacy. These results are somewhat 
similar to Nurunnabi (2015a) and Nurunnabi (2015b), who concluded that the three pressures 
of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 1991) were intertwined in the 
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configuration of the implementation of institutional practices in country contexts in 
development in general, and in Zhao and Patten (2016) in the area of CSRD particularly. 
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
7. Conclusion 
CSRD practices in Libya are considerably influenced not only by institutional frameworks 
within the country, but also by organizational and social factors that are also open to local and 
global legitimizing forces. This is in line with previous literature that supports the link 
between the national interests of the country and the corporate ownership structure that 
influences disclosure practices. We also discovered that although Libya has several 
established guidelines and several factors influence disclosure practices, significant 
deficiencies in the regulatory framework and legal system remain key issues that must be 
issued to reflect the dynamic nature of the world market. 
Despite managers perceive some coercive, mimetic and normative pressures interplay to 
influence CSRD to attain legitimacy, the regulations of CSRD are still absent. Thus, in order 
to improve performance of the accounting and disclosure practices in Libya, the NOC through 
its human resources and sustainable development departments should put in place monitoring 
and enforcement roles efficiently. Even though Libya has established several guidelines, it 
must be emphasised that without an effective monitoring institutions that implement 
accounting regulations and revision of firms’ laws and policies, CSRD practices will not be 
improved as the guidelines alone is not the solution. Although in the light of the absence of 
law enforcement and its fragile state environment (Boduszyński & Pickard, 2013), political 
instability (Chivvis & Martini, 2014), the uncertainty to what degree official regulations 
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would be useful in this respect, policy and decision makers should consider whether emerging 
pressure from groups such as civil society organisations become adequately structured and 
powerful enough to propel firms towards social disclosure leading to an increased level of 
accounting reporting and disclosure practices. Despite it is questionable whether 
implementing official regulations, at least in the short run, will enable the state to obtain the 
official objectives of CSRD, we recommend that monitoring institutions, revision of the firms’ 
laws and policies, the establishment of CSRD regulations should be undertaken to improve 
accounting disclosure.  
This research contributes to knowledge in several ways. First, this research is one of the few 
studies to use neo-institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Scott, 1987, 2014) to contribute to the literature towards understanding how different factors 
combine in the initiation of CSRD in a fragile state. It explored how such institutional context 
acts as pressures for CSRD adoption, thus, highlighting how institutional isomorphism is 
intensely interrelated within the framework of the cultural values of the societal system and 
national context (Nurunnabi, 2015a). Second, and in contrast to previous studies (Amran & 
Devi, 2008; Amran & Haniffa, 2011; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013) which tend to entirely 
concentrate on examining company level determinants, this research examined both the 
impact of external and internal institutional contextual factors on CSRD practices. Therefore, 
using neo-institutional theory allowed for a more precise grasp and/or understanding of CSRD 
implementation issues in a specific institutional setting by explaining how companies 
function, and the extent to which structures and guidelines are influenced by their institutional 
settings. Finally, the results of this study might be useful to corporate regulators and policy 
makers in developing a more focussed agenda of CSRD activity, when considering regulations 
for disclosure. 
Despite the results and contributions highlighted above, this research, however, has a number 
of limitations. First, the review of CSRD practices with Libya as a case has the possibility of 
offering unique information on the context of the countries of North Africa, especially in light 
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of recent changes, but it can generate several risks by generalizing (Bryman, 2016). Perhaps 
using more extensive research on more states using the institutional profile of each country, 
the extent to which the findings of current research could be transmitted to other states in 
North Africa could have been more applicable in this context. Second, this research is limited 
only to the oil and gas industry, therefore; Investigating other industries and classifying 
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Table 1: The Legal and Regulatory Framework in Libya 
Name of the institution 
and/or law 
Key aspects  Relevant to firms 





• Updating the HSE.POL.000.00. Establishment of HSE.GDL.001.00 & 
HSE.PRO.002.00 social responsibility monitoring reporting requirements 
guidelines (NOC Department, 2014). 
• Establishment of the sustainable development department to encourage firms to 
engage in CSR and its disclosure 
Yes Yes 
The Libyan Commercial 
Activity Law No 23 of 
2010 
• The number of board members has not been specified. 
• Board members are required to meet at least six times a year. 
• The General Assembly assesses the firm responses to the Public Control Office 
comments on the annual reports. 
• State-owned companies or joint venture firms are required to possess the 
subsequent records “a minute record of the meetings of the board directors and 
its decisions, a minute record of the monitoring committee’s meetings and its 
decisions, a minute record of the meetings of the executive committee and its 
decisions”.  
Yes No articles within this 
law refer to CSRD. 
The Libyan Corporate 
Governance Code 2005 
• Part one - the essence of corporate governance and its significance in reducing 
the conflict of interest between parties. 
• Part two - the criteria of the board, how they should perform their duties 
regarding the rights of shareholders, access to information, the attendance of the 
general meeting, voting rights.  
• Part three - the choice of management and its supervisory role including an 
explanation of the most important tasks of the board of directors. 
• Part four - planning and policy formulations including a description of the 
responsibilities of the board of directors and the formulations and monitoring of 
policies and plans.  
• Part five - auditing and internal control. All companies must develop procedures 
and policies of disclosure and supervisory regulations in written forms consistent 
with the LCGC rules. 
It is voluntary but 
companies are 
asked to “comply-
or-explain” basis.  
No articles within this 





































CSRD practice is 
coercive?  
Outcome:  


















1 L    = Local company 
2 JV  = Joint venture company 
3 F    =  Foreign company 
Case 
 










A Company 1 L1 Financial manager M 73 minutes 
2 
 
B Company 1 JV2 Head of health, 
safety and 
Environment 
M 57 minutes 
3 
 
A Company 1 L Quality manager  M 51 minutes 
4 
 
C Company 2 L Accounts manager  M 64 minutes 
5 
 
D Company 2 JV Communication 
manager 
F 46 minutes 
6 
 
E Company 1 F3 Head of health, 
safety and 
Environment 
M 48 minutes 
7 
 
F Company 3 JV Financial manager M 58 minutes 
8 
 
G Company 4 JV Environmental 
manager  
M 61 minutes 
9 
 
H Company 5 JV Head of accounts 
and budget 
M 65 minutes 
10 
 
I Company 2 F Director of finance M 53 minutes 
11 
 
J Company 3 F Head of health, 
safety and 
Environment 
M 68 minutes 
12 
 
K Company 3 L Environmental 
manager 
M 51 minutes 
13 
 
L Company 4 F Auditor F 43 minutes 
14 
 
M Company 4 L Auditor  M 53 minutes 
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Table 3: Profile of the Interviewees (Policy and decision makers within NOC) 
Name of the 
Organisation  
Code for the 
interviewee  
Profession of the 
interviewee*  
Gender Duration of 
the interview 
NOC Interviewee one - M 78 minutes 
NOC Interviewee two  - M 73minutes 
NOC Interviewee three  - M 64 minutes 
NOC Interviewee four - M 56 minutes 
NOC Interviewee five - M 66 minutes 
NOC Interviewee six - M 69 Minutes 
 
*Note: Interviewee position left blank for confidentiality purposes and replaced by code for the 
interviewee in the previous column 
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Table 4.  Codes on factors influncing CSRD adoption 
First-order coding Second-order coding 
NOC  Institutional factors 
Overseas Partners  
Foreign Owned Firms 





Firm’s reputation and image. Social/norm Factors 
Pressures to meet societal 
expectations. 
 



















Table 5: Tracking the Changes within the NOC Pre/Post 2011 Revolution 
The NOC is responsible for the oil and gas operations in Libya, giving licences to companies to operate, 
being in charge of the implementation of laws and firms settlement, and it is engaged in putting into practice 
the Social Security Schemes for employees.  
Pre-2011 Implemented  Post-2011 Implemented 
•  Not Establishment - • Establishment of the sustainable 
development department to 
encourage firms to engage in 
CSR and its disclosure. 
• Yes  
• The Petroleum Law 
No. 25 of 1955 (see 
chapter two section 
2.64 for more details 
about this law) 
Yes • In 2012, the Minister of Oil & 
Gas prepared a draft of a new 
law; however the procedure for 




considering only the 
CSR policy. 
Yes • Updating the HSE.POL.000.00. 





guidelines (NOC Department, 
2014). 
• Yes 
• Not Establishment - • The Minister of Oil & Gas 
issued decision No (32) for the 
year 2012 about making sure 
that the oil and gas companies 
make the necessary 
arrangements for the protection 
of the environment, fight against 
pollution and the requirements 
























Outcome: coercive pressures 
- Government through NOC 
- International pressures e.g.  foreign 
business associates, parent factor 
Outcome: mimetic pressures 
-  Foreign firms activities behaviour 
 
Outcome: normative pressure 
e.g. 
-  Social obligations  
- Society expectations 
- Company’s reputation & image 
 
 
Local and global influences  
Domestic institutional framework  
(Political system, social system, cultural system)  
 
Organisational framework of the firm  
(Internal factors: size, age, reputation & image) 
CSRD practice adoption 
